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Abstract 
 
Persistent institutions, which are captured by legal origin, are considered to influence the 
occurrence and intensity of economic crises. However, little is known about how changes in legal 
origin affect processes of economic development. Using non-European country data, this paper 
investigates the effect of legal origin on natural disaster death tolls from 1960 to 2008, and on the 
two periods 1960–1989 and 1990–2008. The key findings are that natural disaster death tolls are 
higher in French legal origin countries than in other countries in 1990–2008, but not in 
1960–1989. This implies that the role of legal origin, in reducing the level of damage in a disaster, 
changes according to technological progress. 
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I. Introduction 
 
It is certain that human society will experience unexpected events and therefore coping 
with risk is a central issue of modern economics. In more primitive times, societies were 
significantly affected by natural disasters, partly because of a lack of disaster prevention 
technology. This strengthened the incentive to generate such technology, enabling humankind 
with a greater ability to withstand natural disasters. However, even in modern times, recent 
natural disasters, Hurricane Katrina, the Haiti earthquake, and the Kanto-Tohoku earthquake in 
Japan, have resulted in tremendous economic loss. Thus, economists are paying greater attention 
to issues surrounding natural disasters (Cavallo and Noy, 2009). The likelihood of a natural 
disaster depends considerably on geographical characteristics rather than the degree of economic 
development. The resulting damage from natural disasters, however, differs between developed 
and developing countries (Kahn, 2005; Toya and Skidmore, 2007).
1
 The damage caused by 
natural disasters is influenced by economic factors such as economic openness, human capital and 
GDP per capita, and income inequality (Anbarci et al., 2005; Toya and Skidmore, 2007). In 
addition, quality of institution is an important determinant in reducing the damage caused, not 
only by external economic shocks (e.g., Rodrik, 1999; Johnson et al., 2000; Acemoglu et al., 
2003), but also by natural disasters (e.g., Kahn, 2005; Escaleras et al., 2007).
2
  
Institutions are captured by various measures and so can be characterised in numerous 
ways. Some institutions are formed as a consequence of historical events and continue today to be 
a key determinant of socio-economic conditions (Acemoglu et al., 2001; 2002). As stated by Du 
                                                   
1
 The effect of natural disasters on growth has also been explored. Skidmore and Toya (2002) used 
cross-country data to find a positive relationship between natural disasters and growth. In contrast, 
Strobl (2011) suggested that hurricanes have a detrimental impact on the annual growth rate of 
coastal counties in the United States. Kellenberg and Mobarak (2008) showed that the relationship 
between the level of GDP and the damage caused by natural disasters takes an inverted U shape, 
rather than being monotonically negative. 
2 Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) found that quality of institution is the key factor in encouraging 
coups and revolutions, resulting in political and economic instability.  
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(2010), a persistent institution, such as legal origin, has a greater effect on the occurrence and 
intensity of a crisis compared with time-varying institutions such as corruption and autocracy.
3
 
Acemoglu et al. (2002) argued that the various institutions introduced by Europeans into their 
former colonies resulted in a reversal, and subsequent divergence, of income between countries 
because of the emergence of industrialisation during the nineteenth century. Societies with strong 
historical institutions took advantage of the opportunity to industrialise, although not until the 
mid-nineteenth century. Similarly, Rajan and Zingales (2003) found that French civil law 
countries had more developed financial markets than common law countries at the beginning of 
the twentieth century. However, common law countries became more developed in terms of 
financial markets than civil law countries in the mid-twentieth century. This phenomenon was 
termed by Rajan and Zingales (2003) as the Great Reversal. While Bozio (2002) and Michie 
(1999) argued that civil law countries were more developed at the turn of the twentieth century, 
La Porta et al. (2008) disagreed, stating that common law countries were more financially 
developed than civil law countries at that time. La Porta et al. (2008) confirmed that over the 
course of the twentieth century, the differences between civil law and common law countries 
widened, leading to a divergence between the two after the mid-twentieth century. Thus, the effect 
of persistent institutions does change over time, and depends on circumstance.  
Toya and Skidmore (2008) assumed that ―greater openness servers as a proxy for the 
degree of competition and the transferral of technological knowledge from abroad that reduces 
risk.
4
 A more highly developed financial sector may reduce disaster impacts because an efficient 
information based financial system is less likely to finance projects in inherently risky locations‖ 
(Toya and Skidmore 2003, p.22). They then hypothesised that ―greater openness and a more 
highly developed financial sector will experience fewer deaths‖ (Toya and Skidmore 2003, p.22), 
                                                   
3 Cavallo and Cavallo (2010) investigated how political institutions affect growth through their 
interaction with economic crises. 
4 For example, „“the Maldives was spared from severe damage that might have resulted from the 
Southeast Asian Tsunami because Japan provided the technology and assistance to construct a 
massive sea wall around the capital of Male‟” (Toya and Skidmore, 2007, p.22). 
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and presented evidence supporting their hypothesis based on annual data regarding recorded 
disasters in 151 countries, from 1960 to 2003. The construction of buildings involves many steps, 
crucial to its strength and safety. During this process, however, there is a major incentive for the 
developer to engage in poor construction work: the reduction of costs. While there are strict 
building codes to ensure that poor construction does not occur, corruption within the public sector 
enables such shoddy construction, resulting in the failure of buildings in the face of major 
earthquakes (Escaleras et al., 2007). That is, corruption within the public sector increases the level 
of damage caused by natural disasters. These determinants of damage resulting from natural 
disasters are influenced by legal origin (La Porta et al., 2003): French civil law is associated with 
(1) weak investor protection, which in turn is associated with less financial development and 
impediments in obtaining finance (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998), and (2) with greater entry 
regulation, which in turn leads to corruption and larger unofficial economies (Djankov et al., 
2002). Entry regulation also results in lower trade openness (Helpman et al., 2008). Because of 
the above limitations, French civil law countries are expected to suffer greater levels of damage in 
natural disasters than other countries.  
Greater openness has failed to encourage the transference of imported technological 
knowledge into developing countries to reduce their risk, if such knowledge exists at all. 
Financial development does not influence the choice of locations according to inherent risk, if 
there is inherent risk it cannot be precisely calculated because of the lack of technology to 
predict the disaster. Furthermore, a lack of seismically-sensitive engineering results in buildings 
that will not withstand earthquakes even when the public sector has low-level corruption. Hence, 
legal origin does not make a significant contribution to the reduction of the damage caused by 
natural disasters if the disaster prevention technology has not been developed in that society. In 
other words, legal origin becomes a key determinant in reducing the level of damage only if 
disaster prevention technology exists. Accordingly, the role played by legal origin in mitigating 
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the resulting damage of natural disasters is likely to be influenced by the presence of disaster 
prevention technology. This dynamic aspect of the influence of persistent institutions, such as 
legal origin, has not been previously explored, despite the fact that it is important to understand 
the interaction between institution and circumstance. To examine this relationship, annual data 
regarding recorded disasters in 156 countries, excluding European countries, from 1960 to 2008, 
was used to compare the effect of legal origin on death tolls in natural disasters for two periods, 
1960–1989 and 1990–2008. The key findings of this paper are that the death tolls in French legal 
origin countries are almost identical to those in other countries for 1960–1989, and greater than 
in other countries for 1990–2008.  
This paper is organised as follows: Section 1 describes the data, Section 2 presents the 
econometric specifications, Section 3 exhibits the estimation results, and Section 4 concludes.  
 
1. Data 
 
For the estimations in this paper, I used annual data regarding natural disasters in 156 
countries, from 1960 to 2008. Du (2010) argued that persistent institutions are more closely 
related to the occurrence of crises than time-varying institutions captured by corruption or 
autocracy indexes. Furthermore, proxies for time-varying institutions are considered to be 
endogenous variable, causing estimation bias (Kahn, 2005; Escaleras et al., 2007). As pointed out 
by Beck et al. (2003), legal traditions are thought to be endogenous to their birthplace. However, 
the traditions are exogenous in former colonies, because the legal origin of a colony, obtained via 
colonisation, is largely a coincidental event. In other words, ―legal traditions were typically 
introduced into various countries through conquest and colonizat ion and, as such, were largely 
exogenous‖ (La Porta et al., 2008, p.286). Hence, as exhibited in Table A1, the 156 countries do 
not include European countries and so helps to generate exogenous measures for the institutions. 
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This paper restricts the sample to non-European countries and therefore estimation results do not 
suffer from bias. 
Table 1 presents the definition and the source of each variable used in this paper. The 
dependent variable is the number of deaths caused by natural disasters. The data for DEAT (death 
toll in natural disasters) and NDIS (number of disasters) were gathered from EM-DAT 
(Emergency Events Database).
5
 GDP (GDP per capita), POP (population), GOVSIZ (government 
size), and AGRAT (value-added of agriculture /GDP) were collected from the World Bank (2010). 
The available data for these variables covered the period 1960 to 2008. Thus, the data used in the 
estimations do not include 2009. GINI (income Gini coefficients) is collected from the 
Standardized Income Distribution Database (SIDD) developed by Salvatore
 
(2008).
6
  
Figure 1 demonstrates the trends in the log of deaths per disaster for 1960–2008, whereas 
Figure 2 illustrates the trends in GDP per capita for 1960–2008. A cursory examination of Figure 
1 reveals that deaths per disaster decreased over time. The improvement of disaster prevention 
technologies, such as earthquake-strengthened buildings and early warning systems, are 
considered a key factor in reducing the damage caused by natural disasters (Escaleras and 
Register, 2008; United Nations, 2010). I interpret the declining trend illustrated in Figure 1 as 
suggesting that progress in disaster prevention technology has reduced the death tolls in disasters. 
I see from Figure 2 that GDP per capita has increased over time, suggesting that countries 
experienced economic growth after 1960. Jointly considering Figures 1 and 2 leads me to assume 
that the progress in disaster prevention technology, accompanied by economic development, 
reduces the level of damage caused by natural disasters. However, low-quality institutions appear 
to impede the diffusion of new technology in developing countries, even where new technology is 
available. For instance, buildings may not be adequately constructed because of corruption within 
                                                   
5 Data was obtained from http://www.emdat.be. (accessed on June 1, 2011). 
6 Data was obtained from http://salvatorebabones.com/data-downloads. (accessed on June 1, 2011). 
The paper used SIDD-3, which is an interpolated and extrapolated version of SIDD-2 incorporating 
in-sample and out-of-sample estimates for 1955–2005. To extend the data, I made the values for 
2006–2008 the same as the values for 2005. 
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the public sector, even when earthquake-resistant/anti-earthquake design has been developed 
(Escaleras et al., 2007). This is supported by evidence that French legal origin countries have 
low-quality infrastructure (La Porta et al., 1999). In contrast, institutional condit ions play a minor 
role in determining the level of damage in a disaster if disaster prevention technology does not 
exist. In other words, the degree of adaptation of technology appears to depend on the quality of 
institution after the disaster prevention technology has been developed. 
Table 2 exhibits the difference of the log of deaths per disaster and GDP per capita 
between French legal origin countries and other countries. Table 2 suggests that the death tolls in 
disasters in French legal origin countries are significantly higher than other countries during the 
period 1960–2008. After splitting the period into two, 1960–1989 and 1990–2008, a significant 
difference between the French legal origin countries and the other countries for the two periods 
continues. Furthermore, it is interesting to observe that the difference between the two country 
types for 1990–2008 (0.27) is approximately four times greater than the differences for 
1960–1989 (0.07). In contrast, GDP per capita in the French legal origin countries is significantly 
greater than that of the other countries for the period 1960–2008. The level of GDP per capita 
increased over time in both the French legal origin countries and the other countries, suggesting 
that both have experienced economic development in both periods. The difference between 
French legal origin countries and the other countries for GDP per capita in 1990–2008 
(US$2,018) is smaller than that for 1960–1989 (US$4,049). The role of legal origin in the 
reduction of death tolls caused by disasters increased over time even though the influence of legal 
origin on economic development has decreased. Thus, I raise the following hypothesis:  
 
HYPOTHESIS. Legal origin plays a greater role in the reduction of deaths caused by natural 
disasters where there are improvements in disaster prevention technology.  
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2. Econometric Specifications  
To test the hypothesis, I estimated a model that follows a form used in previous research 
(e.g., Kahn, 2005; Toya and Skidmore, 2007; Cavallo et al., 2010): 
DEATit = 0 + 1FRLEGAi + 2NDISit + 3GDPit + 3OPENit + 4AGRATit + 5GINIit + 6GOVSIZit + 
7DENSit + 8LANDit + 9AFRIi + 10LAMRIi + 11EASIAi + ut + εit,              
 
where the dependent variable is DEATit in country i, for year t. The regression parameters are 
denoted by , and ut represents the unobservable year effects of year t. The effects of ut are 
controlled for by including year dummies. The error term is denoted by εit and FRLEGA is the 
dummy variable for the French legal origin, as defined by La Porta et al. (1999). Among the 156 
countries included in the sample, 86 are French legal origin countries. Thus, approximately half of 
the countries‘ legal origin is from French civil law. DEAT is the number of deaths in disasters, 
which does not take a negative value. In this study, the Poisson model is used as the basic method 
of estimation. However, the Poisson model assumes that the mean of a dependent variable is equal 
to its variance. As commented in previous research (Kahn, 2005; Escaleras et al., 2007), DEAT is 
over-dispersed and its variance is large. The use of the Poisson model here causes a downward 
bias and inflates the z-statistics, and as such, the negative binominal model is preferred 
(Wooldridge, 2002, ch.19). The negative binominal model is used in empirical analysis to 
examine the effect of disasters in existing research (e.g., Anbarci et al., 2006; Escaleras et al., 
2007; Kellenberg and Mobarak, 2008), because the damage caused by natural disasters is 
characterised by over-dispersion. Following previous studies, the negative binominal model is 
also used in this paper. 
The main purpose of this paper is to examine how and the extent to which the death toll in 
French civil law countries differs from other countries and whether that difference changes 
because of progresses in technology. The hypothesis proposed in the previous section leads me to 
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expect that the coefficient for FRLEGA will take the negative sign when well-developed 
anti-disaster technology exists. To test the hypothesis, I assumed that disaster prevention 
technology has progressed over time in the process of technological development. Under this 
assumption, I divided the study period 1960–2008 into a period of less technological development 
(1960–1989) and one with greater technological advancements (1990–2008). I conducted separate 
estimations for each sample and compared the coefficients for FRLEGA between the two periods 
to test the hypothesis. 
Other control variables were included to control for economic conditions such as GDP 
(GDP per capita), OPEN (trade openness), AGRAT (ratio of agricultural sector), and GINI 
(income inequality). These variables are used because individuals with higher levels of income 
can respond to risks such as natural disasters by using additional costly precautionary measures. 
As exhibited in previous research (Kahn, 2005, Toya and Skidmore, 2007), GDP leads to a 
reduction in the level of damage caused by natural disasters.
7
 As explained earlier, trade 
openness was found to reduce the damage caused by natural disasters through the transfer of 
technology from abroad (Toya and Skidmore, 2007). GINI is found to increase the damage level 
in natural disasters (Anbarci et al., 2005). The shock of natural disasters appears to differ between 
agricultural and other sectors because farmers are directly affected to a greater extent by natural 
circumstances. GOVSIZ (government size) is used to capture the presence of government. Greater 
numbers of people are exposed to natural disasters in more densely populated areas. Thus, when 
natural disasters occur, countries with greater population density suffer greater numbers of deaths 
than less densely populated ones. Furthermore, countries with larger land areas appear to 
experience natural disasters more frequently, leading to an increase in the possibility of deaths 
caused by natural disaster. DENS (population density) and LAND (land area) are incorporated to 
control for these situations. Furthermore, area dummies such as AFRI, LAME, and EASIA are 
                                                   
7 Cavallo et al. (2010) exhibited the opposite result, where GDP per capita increased the level of 
damage caused by disasters. 
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included to control for geographical locations that are closely related to the occurrence of natural 
disasters (Kahn, 2005). 
Financial development (Toya and Skidmore, 2007) and corruption (Escaleras et al., 2007) 
are considered to be key determinants in the level of damage caused by natural disasters. However, 
an index for financial development is not included here because the sample size would be reduced 
considerably if the index was included as an independent variable. A corruption index is also 
excluded because one could not be obtained for the 1960s and 1970s.
8
 Furthermore, ―public 
sector corruption is commonly known to be highly correlated with … omitted institutional 
factors‖ (Escaleras et al., 2007, p.219). Thus, a corruption index is regarded as an endogenous 
variable, causing the estimation results to suffer from bias. The aim of this paper is to focus on 
changes in the effect of legal origin, which is historically and externally determined. 
 
 
3. Results 
 
The estimation results for the entire study period 1960–2008 are presented in Table 3. The 
results for 1960–1989 are exhibited in Table 4 while those for 1990–2008 are in Table 5. As 
shown in Table 1, the standard deviation of DEAT is 27,020, which is almost 27 times greater than 
its mean value. Hence, there is the possibility that outliers regarding the death tolls from natural 
disasters have significantly influenced the estimation results. That is, the results may be driven by 
outliers. In ascertaining the determinants of damage caused by natural disasters, Escaleras et al. 
(2007) conducted additional estimations using a sub-sample that excluded outliers to alleviate 
their influence. Thus, this paper also conducted estimations using sub-sample data. Table 1 shows 
                                                   
8 As used by Escaleras et al. (2007), the popular indexes for public sector corruption are constructed by 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and Transparency International (TI). However, ICRG 
provides the corruption index from 1984 to 2010, while TI provides the same from 1995 to 2010. 
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that the mean value of DEAT is 992. Thus, the exclusion of observations where DEAT is greater 
than 1,000 is considered to control for the effect of outliers. In each table, results based on the 
sample that includes the entire range of death rates are presented in columns (1)–(4), while results 
based on the sub-sample restricted to number of deaths smaller than 1,000 are shown in columns 
(5)–(8). The robust standard errors were calculated using clusters for each country. Then, z-values 
were obtained from the cluster–robust standard errors. In each column, the sample size may vary 
across the different specifications because of data availability.  
In Table 3, the coefficient for FRLEGA takes the negative sign in all estimations. In addition, 
it is statistically significant in columns (1)–(7). It follows then, that the significant positive sign 
for FRLEGA is observed not only in the full sample but also in the sub-sample without outliers. 
Hence, the results are unchanged in the various specifications and for different samples. This 
implies that the death tolls caused by natural disasters in French legal origin countries are greater 
than for other countries, which is in line with the prediction. Concerning the other control 
variables, the significant negative signs for the coefficient for GDP and OPEN are congruent to 
previous research (e.g., Kahn, 2005; Toya and Skidmore, 2007). Considering FRLEGA and OPEN 
jointly reveals that French regal origin countries suffer a greater number of deaths even when the 
transfer of imported technology via international trade is controlled for.  
Turning to Table 4, it is surprising to observe that the sign of the coefficient for FRLEGA 
varies according to the specifications, and that the coefficient is not statistically significant with 
the exception of column (1). This indicates that the death toll in French legal origin countries did 
not differ with that of other legal origin countries for 1960–1989. That is, legal origin does not 
influence the number of deaths in natural disasters when there is a high death toll per disaster. I 
interpret this to mean that legal origin plays a minor role when disaster prevention technology has 
not been sufficiently developed. In contrast, GDP continues to take the negative sign and be 
statistically significant in all estimations. The significant negative sign of OPEN is observed even 
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in the period of technological development (1990–2008), suggesting that the effect of trade 
openness does not come via the transfer of technology, contrary to the conjecture. AGRAT yields 
the negative sign and is statistically significant in all estimations. That is, the larger the 
agricultural sector is, the smaller the number of deaths in a natural disaster. The sampled countries 
do not include European countries, with agriculture considered as a labour-intensive industry. 
Hence, a large agricultural sector means a small capital-intensive industry. Disaster prevention 
technology appears to make capital stock more durable in a natural disaster. Therefore, I interpret 
the significant negative sign of AGRAT as suggesting that capital-intensive industries are more 
likely to suffer damage in a natural disaster due to a lack of disaster prevention technology. In 
addition to AGRAT, AFRI also produces negative signs in all estimations and is statistically 
significant in columns (1), (3), (4), (7), and (8). Similar to the results for AGRAT, a scarcity of 
capital stock in African countries reduces the level of damage in natural disasters. 
With respect to Table 5, FRLEGA yields the positive sign and is statistically significant in all 
estimations, suggesting that the results for FRLEGA are robust in the alternative specifications 
and are not driven by outliers. In contrast with the results in Table 4, the death tolls in French 
legal origin countries are larger than in other countries. That is, legal origin is effective in 
reducing the number of deaths caused by natural disasters in the period when the death toll per 
disaster is lower. The combined results for FRLEG shown in Tables 4 and 5 lead me to argue that 
the importance of legal origin depends on circumstances, strongly supporting the hypothesis 
proposed previously. That is, legal origin becomes a greater determinant of the number of deaths 
caused by natural disasters as disaster prevention technology progresses. Furthermore, AGRA 
yields the positive sign and statistically significant in all estimations. AFRI produces the positive 
sign and statistically significant in columns (1), (2), (5), and (6).
9
 The results for AGRA and 
                                                   
9 A further interpretation regarding the positive sign for AFRI is as follows. Collier (2009) argued that 
after the 1990s, democracy resulted in political instability and conflict in African countries. This may 
reduce long-term investment and lead to poorly constructed buildings. This in turn resulted in a 
greater number of deaths caused by natural disasters in African countries.  
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AFRI in Table 5 are converse to those in Table 4. As disaster prevention technology progresses, 
capital-intensive industries are better able to withstand natural disasters in 1990–2008 than in 
1960–1989. Hence, the larger the capital-intensive industry, the smaller the level of damage 
caused by natural disasters. These results provide supporting evidence for the hypothesis. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Even in modern society, natural disasters continue to wreck devastating damage to 
socio-economic stability. However, deaths per natural disaster have decreased over time. This 
may be, in part, because of the progress made in disaster prevention technology. In addition, 
institutional conditions are considered to play an important role in reducing the damage suffered 
in natural disasters. The effectiveness of technology is believed to depend on the institution. In 
other words, the interaction between technology and institution can be considered a key 
determinant in reducing the damage caused by natural disasters. 
However, little is known about how the emergence of technology can change institutional 
effect. Using non-European country data, this paper investigated the effect of legal origin on the 
death tolls in natural disasters over a significant period, and then compared that effect between 
two periods, 1960–1989 and 1990–2008. The key findings are that the number of deaths in natural 
disasters is higher in French legal origin countries than in other countries for the period 
1990–2008. However, this tendency is not observed in the earlier period, 1960–1989. Thus, weak 
institutions, captured by French legal origin, reduce the effectiveness of technology, resulting in 
larger numbers of deaths even after progresses in technology. The effect of legal origin on 
outcomes in disasters has increased over time rather than decreased. That is, the institution 
formed externally, long ago, did not affect the level of damage caused by a natural disaster if there 
had been little progress in technology. Institution is only important when there has been sufficient 
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technological advancements and, therefore, it is effective in reducing the level of damage. 
Previous works (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2002; La Porta et al., 2008; Rajan and Zingales, 2003) 
showed that persistent institutions lead to different economic outcomes because of changes in 
circumstances. The contribution of this paper is to provide additional evidence to understand how 
the role of persistent institutions change over time and are dependent on circumstance.  
This paper has explored the change in the role of legal origin with regard the damage 
caused by natural disasters in the process of economic development. Here, I have simply assumed 
that technology has increasingly emerged or improved over time and hence there is a significant 
difference in the level of the technology between the two periods studied in this paper. This 
assumption is, however, not investigated directly and so open to debate. An index of technological 
improvement should be used to directly examine how and the extent to which interaction between 
technology and institution is important to reduce the level of damage caused by disasters. 
Furthermore, in the introduction, the effect of legal origin is assumed to be via three channels: 
financial development, trade openness, and the level of corruption within the public sector. 
However, it is likely that legal origin affects death tolls via other channels too. The estimation 
results are unchanged even after controlling for trade openness. However, this paper does not 
distinguish between other channels linking to legal origin and the damage caused by natural 
disasters. It would also be worthwhile gaining a deeper understanding of the relative importance 
of those various channels. These remaining issues should be addressed in future work.  
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Fig. 1. Trends in Log of Deaths per Disaster 1960–2008 
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Fig. 2. Trends in GDP per Capita 1960–2008 
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Table 1.  
                       Definition of Variables, Mean, Standard Deviation and Data Source  
 Definition Observations Mean Standard 
deviation 
Source 
DEAT Deaths caused by natural disaster 3282 992 
 
27020 Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT)a 
FRLEGA French legal origin dummy 3282 0.5 
 
--- 
 
La Porta et al. (1999)b 
NDIS Total number of disasters 3282 1.90 
  
3.55 Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT)a 
GDP GDP per capita (thousand US$: 
constant 2,000 US$) 
3282 0.30 0.58 World Development Indicators 2010 
OPEN Trade (% of GDP) 
 
3282 69.2 45.5 World Development Indicators 2010 
AGRAT Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) 3282  22.8 
  
 15.6 World Development Indicators 2010 
GINI Income Gini coefficients 
 
3282   0.47 0.09 Standardized Income Distribution 
Database (SIDD)c 
GOVSIZ General government final 
consumption expenditure (% of GDP) 
3282  14.5  6.16 World Development Indicators 2010 
DENS Population density (thousand people 
per sq km) 
3282   0.14 
 
 0.57 World Development Indicators 2010 
LAND Land area (Million sq km) 
 
3282   1.09  2.27 World Development Indicators 2010 
AFRI Africa dummy 
 
3282   0.33 --- 
 
World Development Indicators 2010 
LAME Latin America dummy 3282   0.24 
 
--- 
 
World Development Indicators 2010 
EASIA East Asia dummy 3282   0.16 
 
--- 
 
World Development Indicators 2010 
Notes: Sample is the same as that used for estimation results shown in column (4) of Table 2. 
a. Data obtained from http://www.emdat.be. (accessed on June 1, 2011). 
b. Data is available from http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/dataset (accessed on June 1, 2011).  
c. Data is available from http://salvatorebabones.com/data-downloads (accessed June 2, 2011). 
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Table 2. 
Comparison between French Legal Origin Countries and Other Countries 
(results of mean difference test) 
Variable: 
Ln (deaths per disaster) 
          (1) 
French legal origin 
countries 
     (2) 
Other countries 
Difference between 
(1) and (2) 
t-statistics 
1960–2008 
 
3.35 
 
2.11 
 
0.22*** 
(2.84) 
1960–1989 
 
3.78 
 
3.70 
 
0.07 
(0.58) 
1990–2008 
 
3.04 
 
2.76 
 
0.27*** 
(3.03) 
Variable: 
GDP per capita 
   
1960–2008 
 
3183 
 
6144 
 
–2960*** 
(–13.7) 
1960–1989 
 
2573 
 
5604 
 
–4049*** 
(–12.1) 
1990–2008 
 
3940 
 
6659 
 
–2718*** 
(–7.54) 
Note: Values in parentheses are t-statistics. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   
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Table 3.  
          Determinants of Annual National Death Rates in Natural Disasters: 1960–2008 (negative-binominal regressions) 
            All observations           Number of deaths < 1000 
 (1)   (2) (3) (4)  (5)   (6) (7) (8) 
FRLEGA 0.74*** 
(2.98) 
0.58** 
(2.55) 
1.01*** 
(3.77) 
0.87*** 
(3.11) 
 0.49** 
(2.19) 
0.36* 
(1.74) 
0.50* 
(1.83) 
0.31 
(1.24) 
NDIS 1.59*** 
(4.20) 
1.29*** 
(3.49) 
0.79*** 
(3.36) 
0.74*** 
(2.98) 
 1.52*** 
(4.04) 
1.28*** 
(3.76) 
0.81*** 
(3.27) 
0.78*** 
(3.16) 
GDP –0.94*** 
(–5.98) 
–0.78*** 
(–4.32) 
–0.30 
(–1.56) 
–0.36** 
(–2.02) 
 –0.74*** 
(–5.74) 
–0.47*** 
(–2.83) 
–0.12 
(–0.67) 
–0.26 
(–1.55) 
OPEN  –0.01*** 
(–4.97) 
–0.01*** 
(–6.70) 
–0.01*** 
(–5.10) 
  –0.01*** 
(–4.56) 
–0.01**
* 
(–6.22) 
–0.01**
* 
(–3.90) 
AGRAT  
 
 0.01** 
(2.70) 
0.01 
(1.48) 
  
 
 0.01* 
(1.74) 
–0.01 
(–0.14) 
GINI   –0.28 
(–0.26) 
0.10 
(0.10) 
   0.29 
(0.28) 
0.60 
(0.59) 
GOVSIZ    –0.07*** 
(–3.20) 
    –0.08**
* 
(–4.79) 
DENS –0.19* 
(–1.89) 
0.17 
(0.70) 
0.42*** 
(3.13) 
0.24* 
(1.70) 
 –0.21** 
(–2.37) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
0.29** 
(2.25) 
0.05 
(0.49) 
LAND 0.13* 
(1.69) 
0.03 
(0.43) 
0.03 
(0.47) 
0.03 
(0.53) 
 0.05 
(1.28) 
–0.03 
(–0.66) 
–0.06 
(–1.23) 
–0.03 
(–0.78) 
AFRI 0.07 
(0.26) 
0.05 
(0.21) 
–0.59** 
(–2.01) 
–0.54* 
(–1.86) 
 0.10 
(0.37) 
0.08 
(0.36) 
–0.36 
(–1.31) 
–0.28 
(–1.17) 
LAME –0.58* 
(–1.65) 
–0.34 
(–1.09) 
–0.53 
(–1.42) 
–0.80** 
(–2.09) 
 –0.60* 
(–1.91) 
–0.44 
(–1.60) 
–0.49 
(–1.38) 
–0.78** 
(–2.34) 
EASIA 0.19 
(0.49) 
0.46 
(1.45) 
0.51* 
(1.73) 
0.25 
(0.87) 
 0.32 
(0.89) 
0.44 
(1.39) 
0.40 
(1.26) 
0.06 
(0.23) 
Constant 
 
1.61* 
(1.92) 
2.38** 
(2.29) 
1.60 
(1.42) 
2.69** 
(2.20) 
 1.55** 
(2.24) 
1.95** 
(2.58) 
1.51 
(1.19) 
3.03** 
(2.41) 
Ln  
 
2.46 2.40 2.24 2.23  2.25 2.19 
 
2.06 2.04 
Observations 
 
5750 5344 3363 3282  5549 5147 3191 3120 
Log likelihood 
function 
–17060 –16493 –11891 –11654  –14371 –13878 –9842 –9599 
Note: Year dummies are included in all estimations but not reported to save space. Values in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors adjusted for 
within-nation clustering. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. In each column, the sample size may vary across different specifications due 
to data availability. 
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Table 4.  
          Determinants of Annual National Death Rates in Natural Disasters: 1960–1989 (negative-binominal regressions) 
            All observations           Number of deaths < 1000 
 (1)   (2) (3) (4)  (5)   (6) (7) (8) 
FRLEGA 0.53* 
(1.84) 
–0.04 
(–0.13) 
0.08 
(0.21) 
0.02 
(0.07) 
 –0.06 
(–0.28) 
–0.38 
(–1.52) 
–0.53 
(–1.47) 
–0.56 
(–1.56) 
NDIS 4.21*** 
(4.41) 
3.40*** 
(2.93) 
2.00** 
(2.56) 
2.06** 
(2.59) 
 4.28*** 
(6.11) 
3.69*** 
(4.67) 
2.67*** 
(2.95) 
2.58*** 
(2.83) 
GDP –2.24*** 
(–7.81) 
–2.32*** 
(–9.40) 
–2.21*** 
(–6.32) 
–2.08** 
(–6.21) 
 –1.29*** 
(–6.26) 
–1.05*** 
(–5.18) 
–1.07**
* 
(–3.60) 
–1.12**
* 
(–3.83) 
OPEN  –0.02*** 
(–4.04) 
–0.03*** 
(–5.03) 
–0.01** 
(–2.49) 
  –0.01*** 
(–5.09) 
–0.02**
* 
(–4.94) 
–0.01**
* 
(–3.11) 
AGRAT  
 
 –0.02** 
(–2.15) 
–0.02** 
(–2.50) 
  
 
 –0.02**
* 
(–3.01) 
–0.03**
* 
(–3.19) 
GINI   0.14 
(0.06) 
0.32 
(0.14) 
   0.01 
(0.39) 
0.59 
(0.27) 
GOVSIZ    –0.10** 
(–2.55) 
    –0.05* 
(–1.72) 
DENS –0.59** 
(–2.37) 
0.15 
(0.67) 
0.18 
(0.36) 
0.40 
(0.69) 
 –0.55** 
(–2.36) 
–0.01 
(–0.08) 
–0.41 
(–0.83) 
–0.66 
(–1.34) 
LAND 0.12* 
(1.96) 
0.02 
(0.41) 
–0.04 
(–0.67) 
–0.01 
(–0.21) 
 0.06 
(1.48) 
–0.05 
(–1.28) 
–0.16** 
(–2.43) 
–0.11* 
(–1.71) 
AFRI –0.91** 
(–2.39) 
–0.57 
(–1.64) 
–1.33*** 
(–4.52) 
–1.26*** 
(–4.21) 
 –0.47 
(–1.62) 
–0.43 
(–1.61) 
–1.16**
* 
(–3.27) 
–1.02**
* 
(–3.11) 
LAME –0.32 
(–0.74) 
0.37 
(0.90) 
–0.47 
(–1.05) 
–0.91* 
(–1.93) 
 –0.34 
(–1.12) 
–0.07 
(–0.26) 
–0.88* 
(–1.83) 
–0.96** 
(–2.01) 
EASIA 0.58 
(1.20) 
0.51 
(1.28) 
0.17 
(0.37) 
–0.05 
(–0.11) 
 0.28 
(0.75) 
0.11 
(0.35) 
–0.58 
(–1.65) 
–0.59* 
(–1.69) 
Constant 
 
–1.07 
(–1.08) 
0.22 
(0.17) 
2.99 
(1.55) 
4.21** 
(2.20) 
 –0.80 
(–1.04) 
0.33 
(0.34) 
2.95* 
(1.68) 
3.71** 
(2.03) 
Ln  
 
2.65 2.59 2.49 2.48  2.39 2.33 
 
2.26 2.26 
Observations 
 
2931 2651 1725 1693  2836 2559 1647 1615 
Log likelihood 
function 
–6837 –6592 –5038 –4937  –5525 –5329 –4016 –3922 
Note: Year dummies are included in all estimations but not reported to save space. Values in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors adjusted for 
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within-nation clustering. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. In each column, the sample size may vary across different specifications due 
to data availability. 
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Table 5.  
          Determinants of Annual National Death Rates in Natural Disasters: 1990–2008 (negative-binominal regressions) 
            All observations           Number of deaths < 1000 
 (1)   (2) (3) (4)  (5)   (6) (7) (8) 
FRLEGA 0.81*** 
(2.89) 
0.69** 
(2.44) 
1.03*** 
(3.50) 
0.87*** 
(2.74) 
 0.67*** 
(2.90) 
0.63*** 
(2.63) 
0.80*** 
(3.06) 
0.56** 
(2.21) 
NDIS 0.95*** 
(4.73) 
0.83*** 
(4.11) 
0.65*** 
(4.47) 
0.61*** 
(3.89) 
 0.85*** 
(4.90) 
0.78*** 
(4.56) 
0.56*** 
(3.74) 
0.51*** 
(3.33) 
GDP –0.46*** 
(–5-3.62) 
–0.36** 
(–2.54) 
–0.10 
(–0.67) 
–0.09** 
(–0.63) 
 –0.54*** 
(–4.75) 
–0.47*** 
(–3.52) 
–0.23 
(–1.37) 
–0.26* 
(–1.76) 
OPEN  –0.01*** 
(–2.64) 
–0.01*** 
(–4.25) 
–0.01*** 
(–3.88) 
  –0.004* 
(–1.81) 
–0.01**
* 
(–3.23) 
–0.01**
* 
(–2.61) 
AGRAT  
 
 0.02*** 
(2.67) 
0.03** 
(2.41) 
  
 
 0.02*** 
(2.92) 
0.01** 
(2.31) 
GINI   0.51 
(0.52) 
0.66 
(0.62) 
   –0.11 
(–0.13) 
0.27 
(0.30) 
GOVSIZ    –0.04* 
(–1.81) 
    –0.06**
* 
(–3.61) 
DENS –0.20* 
(–1.95) 
–0.01 
(–0.03) 
0.28** 
(2.16) 
0.20* 
(1.65) 
 –0.15 
(–1.47) 
–0.06 
(–0.37) 
0.20* 
(1.92) 
0.07 
(0.82) 
LAND –0.11*** 
(–3.52) 
–0.12*** 
(–3.63) 
–0.09*** 
(–2.69) 
–0.08** 
(–2.25) 
 –0.06** 
(–2.11) 
–0.07** 
(–2.38) 
–0.05 
(–1.62) 
–0.02 
(–0.84) 
AFRI 0.83*** 
(2.73) 
0.74** 
(2.34) 
0.08 
(0.23) 
0.10 
(0.27) 
 0.83*** 
(3.10) 
0.79*** 
(2.86) 
0.39 
(1.28) 
0.35 
(1.25) 
LAME –0.34 
(–0.93) 
–0.30 
(–0.83) 
–0.40 
(–0.99) 
–0.48 
(–1.18) 
 –0.46 
(–1.43) 
–0.44 
(–1.39) 
–0.36 
(–1.03) 
–0.55 
(–1.59) 
EASIA 0.14 
(0.38) 
0.35 
(0.94) 
0.48 
(1.42) 
0.31 
(0.88) 
 0.33 
(0.86) 
0.48 
(1.27) 
0.66* 
(1.84) 
0.34 
(0.99) 
Constant 
 
1.92** 
(2.17) 
2.77*** 
(2.73) 
2.77*** 
(2.63) 
3.50*** 
(2.93) 
 1.31*** 
(2.67) 
1.68*** 
(2.97) 
1.84*** 
(3.11) 
2.88*** 
(4.35) 
Ln  
 
2.05 2.03 1.84 1.83  1.88 1.86 
 
1.68 1.66 
Observations 
 
2819 2693 1628 1589  2713 2588 1544 1505 
Log likelihood 
function 
–9862 –9597 –6664 –6534  –8506 –8265 –5639 –5504 
Note: Year dummies are included in all estimations but not reported to save space. Values in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors adjusted for 
within-nation clustering. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. In each column, the sample size may vary across different specifications due 
to data availability. 
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Appendix 
 
                              Table A1 
                            List of countries 
 
Sample in column 
(1) 
Sample in column 
(2) 
Sample in column 
(3) 
Sample in column 
(4) 
1 Albania Albania . . 
2 Algeria Algeria Algeria Algeria 
3 Angola Angola . . 
4 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
. . 
5 Argentina Argentina Argentina Argentina 
6 Armenia Armenia Armenia Armenia 
7 Australia Australia Australia Australia 
8 Azerbaijan Azerbaijan Azerbaijan Azerbaijan 
9 Bahamas Bahamas Bahamas Bahamas 
10 Bahrain Bahrain . . 
11 Bangladesh Bangladesh Bangladesh Bangladesh 
12 Barbados Barbados Barbados Barbados 
13 Belarus Belarus Belarus Belarus 
14 Belize Belize . . 
15 Benin Benin . . 
16 Bermuda . . . 
17 Bhutan Bhutan . . 
18 Bolivia Bolivia Bolivia Bolivia 
19 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
. 
20 Botswana Botswana Botswana Botswana 
21 Brazil Brazil Brazil Brazil 
22 Brunei Brunei . . 
23 Burkina Faso Burkina Faso Burkina Faso Burkina Faso 
24 Burundi Burundi Burundi Burundi 
25 Cambodia Cambodia Cambodia Cambodia 
26 Cameroon Cameroon Cameroon Cameroon 
27 Canada Canada Canada Canada 
28 Cape Verde Cape Verde . . 
29 Central Africa Central Africa Central Africa Central Africa 
30 Chad Chad . . 
31 Chile Chile Chile Chile 
32 China China China China 
33 Colombia Colombia Colombia Colombia 
34 Comoros Comoros . . 
35 Congo, Dem. Rep Congo, Dem. Rep . . 
36 Congo, Rep Congo, Rep . . 
37 Costa Costa Costa Costa 
38 Cote d'Ivoire Cote d'Ivoire Cote d'Ivoire Cote d'Ivoire 
39 Croatia Croatia Croatia Croatia 
40 Cyprus Cyprus . . 
41 Czech Republic Czech Republic Czech Republic Czech Republic 
42 Djibouti Djibouti Djibouti Djibouti 
43 Dominica Dominica . . 
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44 
Dominican 
Republic 
Dominican 
Republic 
Dominican 
Republic 
Dominican 
Republic 
45 Ecuador Ecuador . . 
46 Egypt Egypt Egypt Egypt 
47 El Salvador El Salvador El Salvador El Salvador 
48 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
. . 
49 Eritrea Eritrea . . 
50 Estonia Estonia Estonia Estonia 
51 Ethiopia Ethiopia Ethiopia Ethiopia 
52 Fiji Fiji Fiji Fiji 
53 French Polynesia French Polynesia . . 
54 Gabon Gabon Gabon Gabon 
55 Gambia Gambia Gambia Gambia 
56 Georgia Georgia Georgia Georgia 
57 Ghana Ghana Ghana Ghana 
58 Grenada Grenada . . 
59 Guatemala Guatemala . . 
60 Guinea Guinea Guinea Guinea 
61 Guinea-Bissau Guinea-Bissau Guinea-Bissau Guinea-Bissau 
62 Guyana Guyana Guyana Guyana 
63 Haiti Haiti Haiti Haiti 
64 Honduras Honduras . . 
65 Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong 
66 Iceland Iceland Iceland Iceland 
67 India India . . 
68 Indonesia Indonesia Indonesia Indonesia 
69 Iran Iran Iran Iran 
70 Iraq . . . 
71 Israel Israel . . 
72 Jamaica . . . 
73 Japan Japan Japan Japan 
74 Jordan Jordan Jordan Jordan 
75 Kazakhstan Kazakhstan Kazakhstan Kazakhstan 
76 Kenya Kenya Kenya Kenya 
77 Kiribati Kiribati . . 
78 Korea, Republic Korea, Republic Korea, Republic Korea, Republic 
79 Kuwait Kuwait . . 
80 Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyzstan 
81 Laos Laos Laos Laos 
82 Latvia Latvia Latvia Latvia 
83 Lebanon Lebanon Lebanon Lebanon 
84 Lesotho Lesotho Lesotho Lesotho 
85 Liberia Liberia Liberia Liberia 
86 Libya Libya . . 
87 Lithuania Lithuania Lithuania . 
88 Luxembourg Luxembourg Luxembourg Luxembourg 
89 Macao Macao . . 
90 Macedonia Macedonia Macedonia Macedonia 
91 Madagascar Madagascar Madagascar Madagascar 
92 Malawi Malawi Malawi Malawi 
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93 Malaysia Malaysia Malaysia Malaysia 
94 Maldives Maldives . . 
95 Mali Mali Mali Mali 
96 Marshall Islands . . . 
97 Mauritania Mauritania Mauritania Mauritania 
98 Mauritius Mauritius Mauritius Mauritius 
99 Mexico Mexico Mexico Mexico 
100 Micronesia . . . 
101 Moldova Moldova Moldova Moldova 
102 Mongolia Mongolia Mongolia Mongolia 
103 Morocco Morocco . . 
104 Mozambique Mozambique . . 
105 Namibia Namibia . . 
106 Nepal Nepal Nepal Nepal 
107 New Caledonia . . . 
108 New Zealand New Zealand New Zealand New Zealand 
109 Nicaragua Nicaragua Nicaragua Nicaragua 
110 Niger Niger Niger Niger 
111 Nigeria Nigeria . . 
112 Oman Oman . . 
113 Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan 
114 Panama Panama Panama Panama 
115 
Papua New 
Guinea 
Papua New 
Guinea 
Papua New 
Guinea 
Papua New 
Guinea 
116 Paraguay Paraguay Paraguay Paraguay 
117 Peru Peru Peru Peru 
118 Philippines Philippines Philippines Philippines 
119 Puerto Rico Puerto Rico Puerto Rico Puerto Rico 
120 
Russian 
Federation 
Russian 
Federation 
Russian 
Federation 
Russian 
Federation 
121 Rwanda Rwanda Rwanda . 
122 Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia . . 
123 Senegal Senegal Senegal Senegal 
124 Seychelles Seychelles Seychelles Seychelles 
125 Sierra Leone Sierra Leone Sierra Leone Sierra Leone 
126 Singapore . . . 
127 Solomon Islands Solomon Islands . . 
128 South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa 
129 Sri Lanka Sri Lanka Sri Lanka Sri Lanka 
130 
St. Kitts and 
Nevis 
St. Kitts and 
Nevis 
. . 
131 St. Lucia St. Lucia . . 
132 
St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines 
St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines 
. . 
133 Sudan Sudan Sudan Sudan 
134 Suriname Suriname Suriname Suriname 
135 Swaziland Swaziland Swaziland Swaziland 
136 Syria Syria . . 
137 Tajikistan Tajikistan Tajikistan Tajikistan 
138 Tanzania Tanzania Tanzania Tanzania 
139 Thailand Thailand Thailand Thailand 
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140 Togo Togo . . 
141 Tonga Tonga . . 
142 Trinidad Trinidad Trinidad Trinidad 
143 Tunisia Tunisia Tunisia Tunisia 
144 Turkey Turkey Turkey Turkey 
145 Turkmenistan Turkmenistan Turkmenistan Turkmenistan 
146 Uganda Uganda Uganda Uganda 
147 Ukraine Ukraine Ukraine Ukraine 
148 United States United States United States United States 
149 Uruguay Uruguay Uruguay Uruguay 
150 Uzbekistan Uzbekistan Uzbekistan Uzbekistan 
151 Vanuatu Vanuatu . . 
152 Venezuela Venezuela Venezuela Venezuela 
153 Vietnam Vietnam Vietnam Vietnam 
154 Yemen Yemen Yemen Yemen 
155 Zambia Zambia Zambia Zambia 
156 Zimbabwe Zimbabwe Zimbabwe Zimbabwe 
Note: List shows countries used for estimations in each column of Tables 3, 4, and 5. 
 
